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Abstract
We show that IPC, K4, GL, and S4, as well as all logics inheriting their admissible
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1 Introduction
The study of nonclassical logics usually revolves around provability of formulas. When we
generalize the problem from formulas to inference rules, there arises an important distinction
between derivable and admissible rules, introduced by Lorenzen [12]. A rule is derivable if
it can be inferred from the postulated axioms and rules of the logic (such as modus ponens,
or necessitation); and it is admissible if the set of theorems of the logic is closed under the
rule. In classical logic, these two notions coincide, but nonclassical logics often admit rules
which are not derivable. For example, all intermediate (superintuitionistic) logics admit the
Kreisel–Putnam rule
¬ϕ → ψ ∨ χ / (¬ϕ → ψ) ∨ (¬ϕ → χ),
whereas many of these logics (such as IPC itself) do not derive this rule. A set of admissible
rules in a given logic is a basis of admissible rules, if every admissible rule is derivable from
the basis and the postulated inference rules of the logic.
The research of admissible rules was stimulated by a question of H. Friedman [3], asking
whether admissibility of rules in IPC is decidable. The problem was investigated mainly by
Rybakov (see [13]), who has shown that admissibility is decidable for a large class of modal
and intermediate logics, found semantic criteria for admissibility, proved nonexistence of ﬁnite
bases of admissible rules for many logics (including IPC and K4), and obtained other results
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1on various aspects of admissibility. Ghilardi [5, 6] discovered the connection of admissibility
to projective formulas and uniﬁcation, which provided another criteria for admissibility in
certain modal and intermediate logics. Based on this result, Iemhoﬀ [7] constructed an elegant
explicit basis for rules admissible in IPC, generalized to some other intermediate logics in
[8, 9]. Similar bases for admissible rules of some modal logics were constructed by Jeˇ r´ abek
[10]. A basis for admissible rules of S4 was also constructed earlier by Rybakov [14].
In many contexts (such as linear algebra), the notion of a “basis” involves independence:
a basis is a generating set which has no proper generating subset. Bases of admissible rules
are not required to satisfy this property, and a natural question is when independent bases
of admissible rules exist. The question is nontrivial even for axiomatization of logics by
formulas: there are modal logics without an independent axiomatization by Chagrov and
Zakharyaschev [1]. (In contrast, notice that every countable classical ﬁrst-order theory has
an independent axiomatization.) The problem for rules was investigated in Rybakov [13],
who constructed a tabular logic without an independent basis of admissible rules. Rybakov
et al. [16] have shown that all pretabular extensions of S4 or IPC have an independent basis
of admissible rules, and posed the problem whether the basic transitive logics (K4, S4, IPC)
posses independent bases. The known bases of rules admissible in these logics from [7, 14, 10]
are not independent, as they consist of increasing (with respect to logical consequence) chains
of rules.
We use a modiﬁcation of the bases from [7, 10] to solve the problem aﬃrmatively: IPC,
K4, GL, and S4 do have independent bases of admissible rules, and the same is true for
every logic which inherits the admissible rules of any of these four systems. In fact, the same
basis works for all logics of unbounded width which inherit admissible rules of IPC, whereas
logics of bounded width (which actually implies width at most 2) have ﬁnite bases. A similar
dichotomy holds in the modal cases.
2 Preliminaries
We will use various tools from the theory of modal and intermediate logics, such as the general
frame semantics; we brieﬂy review the relevant deﬁnitions below. More background can be
found in Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [2].
We work with modal logics in a language which contains a single unary connective 2,
besides (any complete set of) connectives of the propositional classical logic. A normal modal
logic is a set of formulas L which contains all classical tautologies, the axiom
(K) 2(p → q) → (2p → 2q),
and which is closed under substitution, modus ponens (MP), and necessitation (Nec):
ϕ,ϕ → ψ / ψ, (MP)
ϕ / 2ϕ. (Nec)
The smallest normal modal logic is called K, and L ⊕ X denotes the normal closure of a
logic L, and a set of formulas X. Some normal modal logics which we need to refer by name
2logic axiomatization
K4 K ⊕ 2p → 22p
S4 K4 ⊕ 2p → p
GL K4 ⊕ 2(2p → p) → 2p
= K ⊕ 2(2p → p) → 2p
GL.3 GL ⊕ 2(2p → q) ∨ 2( · 2q → p)
K4Grz K4 ⊕ 2(2(p → 2p) → p) → 2p
S4Grz K4Grz ⊕ S4
= K ⊕ 2(2(p → 2p) → p) → p
S4.1 S4 ⊕ 23p → 32p
Table 1: some normal modal logics
are listed in table 1. The symbols 3ϕ, · 2ϕ, · 3ϕ, and 2nϕ, are respectively abbreviations for
¬2¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ 2ϕ, ϕ ∨ 3ϕ, and 2···2 | {z }
n
ϕ.
The language of the intuitionistic logic contains the connectives →, ∧, ∨, and ⊥. Negation
is deﬁned as an abbreviation ¬ϕ = (ϕ → ⊥). An intermediate (or superintuitionistic) logic is
a set L of intuitionistic formulas which is closed under substitution and MP, and contains all
tautologies of the intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC, see e.g. [2] for an axiomatization).
Normal modal logics extending K4, and intermediate logics are also called transitive logics.
A (modal) Kripke frame is a pair hF,<i, where < is a binary relation on a set F. As all
modal logics we encounter are extensions of K4, we will require all frames to be transitive.
We will usually denote accessibility relations by the ordering symbol <, in which case ≤ is
the reﬂexive closure of <. (The notation < does not imply that the relation is irreﬂexive.
In particular, if the accessibility relation is already reﬂexive, then < = ≤.) A valuation (or
truth assignment) in hF,<i is a binary relation  between elements of F and formulas, which
locally respects Boolean connectives, and satisﬁes
x  2ϕ iﬀ ∀y ∈ F (x < y ⇒ y  ϕ).
The triple hF,<,i is then called a Kripke model. A general frame is a triple hF,<,V i, where
hF,<i is a Kripke frame, and V ⊆ P(F) is closed under Boolean operations, and under the
operation
X↓ = {y ∈ F; ∃x ∈ X y < x}.
A subset X ⊆ F is admissible in hF,<,V i, if X ∈ V . A valuation  is admissible, if the set
(ϕ) = {x ∈ F; x  ϕ}
is admissible for every formula ϕ (or equivalently, for every propositional variable). We will
identify a Kripke frame hF,<i with the general frame hF,<,P(F)i. A Kripke model hF,<,i
induces the general frame hF,<,V i, where
V = {(ϕ); ϕ is a formula}.
3We will often denote admissible sets or valuations as deﬁnable in induced frames (and, par
abus de langage, in other general frames).
A formula ϕ is valid or satisﬁed in a model hF,<,i if x  ϕ for every x ∈ F, otherwise it
is refuted. A formula is valid in a general frame F = hF,<,V i if it is valid under all admissible
valuations. A logic L is valid in F if all axioms (equivalently: all theorems) of L are valid in
F; in such a case we call F an L-frame. The set of all formulas valid in F is called the logic
of the frame F, and is denoted by L(F). A logic L is complete with respect to a class C of
general frames, if L =
T
{L(F); F ∈ C}. A logic has the ﬁnite model property if it is complete
with respect to a class of ﬁnite frames.
A general frame hF,<,V i is reﬁned if it satisﬁes
∀X ∈ V (x ∈ X ⇔ y ∈ X) ⇒ x = y,
∀X ∈ V (x ∈ 2X ⇒ y ∈ X) ⇒ x < y,
for any x,y ∈ F. Recall that a family of sets has the ﬁnite intersection property (ﬁp) if
every its ﬁnite subfamily has a nonempty intersection. A reﬁned frame hF,<,V i is called
descriptive, if every subset of V with ﬁp has a nonempty intersection. All Kripke frames
are reﬁned, and all ﬁnite reﬁned frames are Kripke frames. A Kripke frame is descriptive iﬀ
it is ﬁnite. For any logic L, canonical frames are particular descriptive L-frames hC,<,V i
constructed as follows. We ﬁx a set P of propositional variables, and let C consist of maximal
(with respect to inclusion) L-consistent sets of formulas over P, where a set of formulas is
called L-consistent if 0L ¬
V
X for every its ﬁnite subset X. We deﬁne an accessibility relation
< on C, and a valuation c, by
X < Y iﬀ ∀ϕ(2ϕ ∈ X ⇒ ϕ ∈ Y ),
X c ϕ iﬀ ϕ ∈ X.
Equivalently,
X < Y iﬀ 3Y ⊆ X,
where 3Y = {3ϕ; ϕ ∈ Y }. We let hC,<,V i be the general frame induced by the model
hC,<,ci. An important corollary of Zorn’s lemma states that every L-consistent set of
formulas is included in a maximal L-consistent set (in other words, it is satisﬁed in a point
of hC,<,ci).
Frame semantics for intuitionistic logic is introduced similarly to modal logic, we will
only indicate the diﬀerences. An intuitionistic Kripke frame is a partially ordered set hF,≤i.
Valuations  in intuitionistic Kripke models are required to make (ϕ) an upper subset
of F for every formula ϕ (or equivalently, for every propositional variable); the monotone
connectives ∧, ∨, ⊥ are evaluated locally as in classical logic, and for → we have
x  ϕ → ψ iﬀ ∀y ∈ F (x ≤ y ∧ y  ϕ ⇒ y  ψ).
An intuitionistic general frame is F = hF,≤,V i, where V is a set of upper subsets of F,
closed under monotone Boolean operations and under the operation
X → Y = F r (X r Y )↓ = {x ∈ F; ∀y ≥ x(y ∈ X ⇒ y ∈ Y )}.
4The frame F is reﬁned if
∀X ∈ V (x ∈ X ⇒ y ∈ X) ⇒ x ≤ y,
and it is descriptive if in addition every subset of V ∪ {F r X; X ∈ V } with ﬁp has a
nonempty intersection. In the intuitionistic case, a canonical L-frame consists of L-consistent
deductively closed sets X with the disjunction property: if ϕ∨ψ ∈ X, then ϕ ∈ X or ψ ∈ X.
The accessibility relation is inclusion.
Let hF,<i be a Kripke frame. A point x ∈ F is called reﬂexive if x < x, otherwise it is
irreﬂexive. We recall that ≤ denotes the reﬂexive closure of <. The preorder ≤ induces an
equivalence relation x ∼ y iﬀ x ≤ y ≤ x; its equivalence classes are called clusters. (In an
intuitionistic frame, all points are reﬂexive, and all clusters are singletons.) For any subset X
of F, we put
X↑ = {y ∈ F; ∃x ∈ X x < y},
X↑ = {y ∈ F; ∃x ∈ X x ≤ y}.
A point x ∈ F is an irreﬂexive tight predecessor of X if x↑ = X↑, and it is a reﬂexive tight
predecessor of X if x↑ = {x} ∪ X↑. Notice that when X = {x} is a reﬂexive singleton, x
is both a reﬂexive and an irreﬂexive tight predecessor of X; in particular, irreﬂexive tight
predecessors do not have to be irreﬂexive points. If F = {x}↑, then F is called a rooted
frame, and x is called its root (any y ∼ x is also a root). A generated subframe of a general
frame hF,<,V i is a frame hG,≺,Wi, where G ⊆ F satisﬁes G↑ ⊆ G, ≺ is the restriction of
< to G, and
W = {X ∩ G; X ∈ V }.
If F is an L-frame, then so is G. Conversely, if every rooted generated subframe of F is
an L-frame, then F is also an L-frame. Generated subframes of Kripke frames are Kripke
frames. A subset X ⊆ F is an antichain, if x ≮ y for any distinct x,y ∈ X. The width of
a rooted frame is the least upper bound on cardinalities of its antichains. In general, the
width of a frame is the lub of widths of its rooted generated subframes. A transitive logic L
has ﬁnite (or bounded) width, if every reﬁned L-frame has ﬁnite width. If L has ﬁnite width,
there actually exists a natural number k such that every reﬁned L-frame has width at most
k; the least such k is called the width of the logic. The width of L also coincides with the
width of any canonical L-frame in an inﬁnite number of variables (if we do not distinguish
inﬁnite cardinalities).
Following [10], we will work with multiple-conclusion (or generalized) rules. These are
expressions of the form Γ / ∆, where Γ and ∆ are ﬁnite sets of formulas (thus syntactically,
rules are the same kind of objects as sequents). We will often omit braces in rules, writing
ϕ1,...,ϕk / ψ1,...,ψ` instead of {ϕ1,...,ϕk} / {ψ1,...,ψ`}. A rule system over a normal
modal or intermediate logic L is a set of rules which is closed under substitution, cut, and
weakening, and which contains all postulated rules of L (MP, Nec, and axioms). A rule % is
derivable over L from a set R of rules, if % is included in the smallest rule system over L which
contains R. If every rule from R0 is derivable from R, and every rule from R0 is derivable from
5R, we say that the sets of rules R and R0 are equivalent. A rule Γ / ∆ is valid in a general
frame hF,<,V i, if for every admissible valuation  such that x  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ and x ∈ F,
there exists ψ ∈ ∆ such that x  ψ for all x ∈ F.
A rule Γ / ∆ is L-admissible, if for every substitution σ such that `L σϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ,
there exists ψ ∈ ∆ such that `L σψ. A set B of L-admissible rules is a basis of L-admissible
rules, if every L-admissible rule is derivable from B over L. A basis B is independent, if no
proper subset of B is a basis. A logic L0 inherits admissible rules of L, if every rule admissible
in L is also admissible in L0. Notice that any logic which inherits L-admissible rules must be
an extension of L. Bases and inheritance of single-conclusion rules are deﬁned in a similar
way. A rule is L-admissible if and only if it is valid in all canonical L-frames, or equivalently,
if it is valid in a canonical L-frame over an inﬁnite set of variables.
We deﬁne the rules listed in ﬁgure 1, where n,m ∈ ω. We also put A◦ = {A◦
n,m; n,m ∈ ω},
and similarly for the other rules. The next theorem, which characterizes admissible rules of
the basic transitive logics, is the starting point of our investigations.
Theorem 2.1 (Iemhoﬀ [7, 8], Jeˇ r´ abek [10]) IPC, K4, GL, and S4 have bases of single-
conclusion and multiple-conclusion admissible rules as given in table 2.
More generally, these rules form a basis of single-conclusion (multiple-conclusion) ad-
missible rules for any logic which inherits single-conclusion (multiple-conclusion) admissible
rules of IPC, K4, GL, or S4.
basis
logic IPC GL S4 K4
multiple-conclusion V A• A◦ A• + A◦
single-conclusion v a• a◦ a• + a◦
Table 2: bases of admissible rules for basic transitive logics
IPC and GL have no proper extensions which inherit their admissible multiple-conclusion
rules. A simple description of all logics inheriting multiple-conclusion admissible rules of
K4 or S4 was given in [11]; in particular, the largest such logics are K4Grz and S4Grz,
respectively.
The structure of logics inheriting only the single-conclusion rules of the basic transitive
logics appears to be more complicated, but at least we have model-theoretic criteria for
inheritance of single-conclusion rules: semantic conditions for logics with the ﬁnite model
property inheriting admissible rules of IPC, S4, and K4 were given by Rybakov (see [13]),
Rybakov et al. [15], and Gencer [4]. Using the methods of the present paper, it is easy to
extend these criteria to logics without FMP, and to GL.
Finally, we remind the reader that the empty set is a ﬁnite set, and zero is a ﬁne natural
number.
62q →
_
i<n
2pi
.
{ · 2q → pi; i < n} (A•
n)
^
j<m
(qj ≡ 2qj) →
_
i<n
2pi
. n ^
j<m
· 2qj → pi; i < n
o
(A◦
n,m)
· 2(q ≡ 2q) →
_
i<n
2pi
.
{ · 2q → pi; i < n} (A0
n)
^
j<n
(pj → qj) →
_
i<n+m
pi
. n^
j<n
(pj → qj) → pi; i < n + m
o
(Vn,m)
_
i<n
pi → q

→
_
i<n
pi
.
{q → pi; i < n} (V 0
n)
2

2q →
_
i<n
2pi

∨ 2r
. _
i<n
2( · 2q → pi) ∨ r (a•
n)
2
 ^
j<m
(qj ≡ 2qj) →
_
i<n
2pi

∨ 2r
. _
i<n
2
 ^
j<m
· 2qj → pi

∨ r (a◦
n,m)
2

· 2(q ≡ 2q) →
_
i<n
2pi

∨ 2r
. _
i<n
2( · 2q → pi) ∨ r (a0
n)
^
j<n
(pj → qj) →
_
i<n+m
pi

∨ r
. _
i<n+m
^
j<n
(pj → qj) → pi

∨ r (vn,m)
_
i<n
pi → q

→
_
i<n
pi

∨ r
. _
i<n
(q → pi) ∨ r (v0
n)
2q →
_
i<n
2pi
. n
· 2

q ∧
^
j6=i
pj

→ pi; i < n
o
(Π•
n)
· 2(q ≡ 2q) →
_
i<n
2pi
. n
· 2

q ∧
^
j6=i
pj

→ pi; i < n
o
(Π◦
n)
_
i<n
pi → q

→
_
i<n
pi
. n
q ∧
^
j6=i
pj → pi; i < n
o
(Πn)
2

2q →
_
i<n
2pi

∨ 2r
. _
i<n
2

· 2

q ∧
^
j6=i
pj

→ pi

∨ r (π•
n)
2

· 2(q ≡ 2q) →
_
i<n
2pi

∨ 2r
. _
i<n
2

· 2

q ∧
^
j6=i
pj

→ pi

∨ r (π◦
n)
_
i<n
pi → q

→
_
i<n
pi

∨ r
. _
i<n

q ∧
^
j6=i
pj → pi

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Figure 1: our battleﬁeld
73 Construction of independent bases
This section is devoted to the proof of our main theorem:
Theorem 3.1 Let L be a modal or intermediate logic.
(i) If L inherits admissible multiple-conclusion rules of IPC, K4, GL, or S4, then it has
an independent basis of admissible multiple-conclusion rules.
(ii) If L inherits admissible single-conclusion rules of IPC, K4, GL, or S4, then it has an
independent basis of admissible single-conclusion rules.
We break the proof of theorem 3.1 into theorems 3.7, 3.10, 3.12, 3.15, and several lemmas.
Lemma 3.2 The sets of rules V and V 0 are equivalent over IPC, and likewise v and v0 are
equivalent over IPC.
Proof: On the one hand, V 0
n follows from the instance of Vn,0 with qi = q, as
W
i<n pi → q is
equivalent to
V
i<n(pi → q), and
^
i<n
(pi → q) → pj `IPC q → pj.
On the other hand, put α =
V
i<n(pi → qi). We have
`IPC (pi → α) → (pi → qi)
for all i < n, hence
`IPC
_
i<n
pi → α

→ α,
which implies
α →
_
i<n+m
pi `IPC
 _
i<n+m
pi → α

→
_
i<n+m
pi.
An instance of V 0
n+m thus derives the rule
α →
_
i<n+m
pi
.
{α → pi; i < n + m},
i.e., Vn,m.
The case of v and v0 is analogous. 2
Lemma 3.3 For every m ∈ ω, there exists a formula α(~ q) such that K4 proves
· 2(α ≡ 2α) →
^
i<m
(qi ≡ 2qi),
^
i<m
qi → α.
In particular, A◦ is equivalent to A0 over K4, and a◦ is equivalent to a0 over K4.
8Proof: Notice that · 2(q ≡ 2q) is equivalent to (q ≡ 2q) ∧ ((q ≡ 2q) ≡ 2(q ≡ 2q)), thus A0
is a special case of A◦, and a0 is a special case of a◦. The other direction clearly follows from
the existence of α, it thus suﬃces to prove the ﬁrst part of the lemma.
We put M = {0,...,m − 1}, and for every X ⊆ M, let qX :=
V
i∈X qi ∧
V
i/ ∈X ¬qi. For
every nonempty C ⊆ P(M) r {M}, we ﬁx f(C) ∈ C, and deﬁne
αC := · 2

qM ∨
 _
X∈C
qX ∧
^
X∈C
3qX

,
α :=
 
2qM → qM
∧
^
C⊆P(M)r{M}
C6=∅
 
αC → ¬qf(C)
.
Clearly, qM → α is a tautology.
Claim 1 K4 proves · 2α → qM, thus 2α ≡ 2qM, and · 2(2α → α) → · 2
 
2qM → qM
.
Proof: Let F be a ﬁnite transitive Kripke model, and x ∈ F such that x 1 qM. Fix a
y ≥ x, y 1 qM such that qM holds in all points above y’s cluster. If y is irreﬂexive, then
y  ¬qM ∧ 2qM, thus y 1 α. If y is reﬂexive, let c be the cluster of y, and deﬁne
C :=

X ( M; ∃z ∈ c z  qX	
.
Clearly, C is a nonempty subset of P(M)r{M}, and every element of c satisﬁes αC. Moreover,
there exists a z ∈ c such that z  qf(C), thus z ≥ x and z 1 α. 2 (Claim 1)
Claim 2 K4 proves
· 2(α → 2α) → · 2
 
αC → qM
for every C ⊆ P(M) r {M} such that |C| ≥ 2.
Proof: Let F be a ﬁnite transitive Kripke model, and x ∈ F such that x  αC ∧ ¬qM. Let
X ∈ C r {f(C)}. By the deﬁnition of αC, there exist z > y ≥ x such that y  qX and
z  qf(C). Clearly z 1 α, thus y 1 2α. It suﬃces to verify y  α. We have y  2qM → qM,
as z 1 qM. Trivially y  αC → ¬qf(C). We claim that y  ¬αD for every C 6= D: if there
exists a Y ∈ C r D, then y  αC ∧ ¬qM implies y  3qY , but αD implies 2¬qY . The case
Y ∈ D r C is symmetric. 2 (Claim 2)
Claim 3 K4 proves
· 2(α ≡ 2α) →
_
X∈P(M)r{M}
α{X} ∨ · 2qM.
Proof: Put
β := · 2(α ≡ 2α) ∧
^
X∈P(M)r{M}
¬α{X}.
We have
` β →
^
C⊆P(M)r{M}
C6=∅
 
αC → ¬qf(C)
by claim 2, and the deﬁnition of β. As β →
 
2qM → qM
by claim 1, we obtain β → α.
Using β → (α → 2α), we have β → · 2α, hence β → · 2qM by claim 1. 2 (Claim 3)
9To ﬁnish the proof of the lemma, consider X ( M, and notice that α{X} implies
^
i∈X
· 2qi ∧
^
i/ ∈X
· 2
 
qi ≡ qM
.
Claim 1 gives ` · 2(α ≡ 2α) →
 
qM ≡ 2qM
, hence
` · 2(α ≡ 2α) ∧ α{X} →
^
i<m
(qi ≡ 2qi).
As X was arbitrary, claim 3 implies
` · 2(α ≡ 2α) →
^
i<m
(qi ≡ 2qi). 2
Lemma 3.4 The sets of rules Π•, Π◦, Π, π•, π◦, and π are equivalent to A•, A◦, V , a•, a◦,
and v, respectively.
Proof: We will consider A•, the other cases are analogous (modulo lemmas 3.2 and 3.3).
Clearly A• derives Π•, we will show that {Π•
m; m ≤ n} derives A•
n by induction on n. The cases
n = 0 and n = 1 are trivial, let n ≥ 2. We work “inside” the rule system K4+{Π•
m; m ≤ n}.
Assume
2q →
_
i<n
2pi.
By Π•
n, we have
(∗) · 2

q ∧
^
j6=i
pj

→ pi
for some i < n. For every j 6= i, we apply the induction hypothesis to
2q → 2(pi ∨ · 2pj) ∨
_
k6=i,j
2pk.
We obtain either · 2q → pk for some k, in which case we are done, or the formula
· 2q → pi ∨ · 2pj.
As j was arbitrary, we have
· 2q → pi ∨ · 2
^
j6=i
pj,
and (∗) implies · 2q → pi. 2
Deﬁnition 3.5 Let hU,<i be the Kripke frame constructed by the following procedure:
• start with the empty frame,
• whenever X is a ﬁnite antichain in U, adjoin to U a reﬂexive and an irreﬂexive tight
predecessor of X, unless it already has one.
10(We remind the reader that reﬂexive singletons are their own tight predecessors.)
Lemma 3.6 If a consistent logic L inherits admissible single-conclusion rules of K4, then
hU,<i is an L-frame.
Proof: K4 admits the rule ϕ / ⊥ whenever ϕ is a variable-free formula unprovable in K4,
thus K4 and L have the same variable-free fragment. Let V be the set of all subsets of U
deﬁnable by a variable-free formula. The general frame hU,<,V i is reﬁned, and its dual is the
free K4-algebra over the empty set of generators (see e.g. [2]), thus hU,<,V i is an L-frame.
Every rooted generated subframe of hU,<,V i is ﬁnite and reﬁned, therefore it is a Kripke
frame. It follows that all rooted generated subframes of the Kripke frame hU,<i are L-frames,
thus hU,<i itself is also an L-frame. 2
Theorem 3.7
(i) If L inherits multiple-conclusion admissible rules of K4, then Π•+Π◦ is an independent
basis of L-admissible multiple-conclusion rules.
(ii) If L is a consistent logic inheriting admissible single-conclusion rules of K4, then π•+π◦
is an independent basis of L-admissible single-conclusion rules.
Proof: The given sets of rules are bases by theorem 2.1, and lemma 3.4, it thus suﬃces to
show their independence over L.
Let n ∈ ω and ∗ ∈ {•,◦}. Fix an antichain X = {xi; i < n} of n irreﬂexive points in
hU,<i, let t be its irreﬂexive (if ∗ = •) or reﬂexive (if ∗ = ◦) tight predecessor, and deﬁne the
Kripke frame F = {x ∈ U; x  t}. F is a generated subframe of U, thus it validates L by
lemma 3.6. Let m ∈ ω and M ∈ {•,◦} be such that m 6= n or M 6= ∗, we will show that ΠM
m
is valid in F. Let  be a valuation in F which refutes all conclusions of ΠM
m, and let yi ∈ F,
i < m be such that yi  · 2
 
q ∧
V
j6=i pj

∧ ¬pi. Then Y = {yi; i < m} is an antichain, and
Y 6= X or M 6= ∗, thus F contains an irreﬂexive (if M = •) or a reﬂexive (if M = ◦) tight
predecessor y of Y . We have y 1
W
i<m 2pi, but y  2q (if M = •) or y  · 2(q ≡ 2q) (if
M = ◦), thus  refutes the assumption of ΠM
m. The modal disjunction property (DP) rule
2p ∨ 2q / p,q also holds in F, because it is downwards directed: if u 1 p and v 1 q for some
valuation  and u,v ∈ F, we can ﬁnd w ∈ F such that w < u,v, hence w 1 2p ∨ 2q. It
follows that the rule πM
m is valid in F, as it is derivable from ΠM
m and DP.
On the other hand, the rules Π∗
n and π∗
n fail in F. Again, the two rules are equivalent over
DP, it thus suﬃces to refute Π∗
n. We deﬁne
x  pi ⇔ x 6= xi.
If ∗ = •, we put
x  q ⇔ x ∈ X↑.
Clearly xi  · 2
 
q∧
V
j6=i pj

∧¬pi, we claim that 2q →
W
i<n 2pi holds in every x ∈ F. Indeed,
if x  2q, then every successor of x belongs to X↑; as x is not an irreﬂexive tight predecessor
of X, we must have x 6< xi for some i < n, thus x  2pi.
11If ∗ = ◦, we deﬁne
x  q ⇔ x ∈ X↑ ∨ ∃y > x(y 6= x ∧ y / ∈ X↑).
We have xi  · 2
 
q ∧
V
j6=i pj

∧ ¬pi as before, we will verify that (q ≡ 2q) →
W
i<n 2pi holds
everywhere in F. Assume x 1
W
i<n 2pi, which means x < xi for every i < n. If x is the
irreﬂexive tight predecessor of X, then x  2q ∧¬q. Otherwise x is neither a reﬂexive nor an
irreﬂexive tight predecessor of X, thus there exists y > x such that y 6= x and y / ∈ X↑. If we
take y maximal with this property, then y 1 q. Clearly x  q, thus x  q ∧ ¬2q. 2
The proof of theorem 3.7 relied essentially on the fact that the 0-generated canonical
frame of K4 has inﬁnite width. IPC, GL, and S4 lack this convenient property, which will
make the proof of theorem 3.1 for their extensions more diﬃcult. We will take GL ﬁrst.
Lemma 3.8 Let L be a transitive modal logic which admits a•, and C a canonical L-frame
in an arbitrary number of variables. If X = {xi; i < n} is a ﬁnite subset of C and x < X,
there exists an irreﬂexive tight predecessor t ∈ C of X, and z ∈ C such that z < x,t.
Proof: Put
a =
n^
i<n
3ϕi ∧ 2ψ; ∀i < nϕi ∧ · 2ψ ∈ xi
o
,
b = 3x ∪ 3a.
We claim that b is L-consistent: if not, there exist ϕi ∈ xi, χ ∈ x, and ψ such that · 2ψ ∈
T
i<n xi, and
`L 2

2ψ →
_
i<n
2¬ϕi

∨ 2¬χ,
because x and a are closed under conjunction. However, we have x < xi 1 · 2ψ → ¬ϕi for
every i < n, hence the formula
_
i<n
2
 
· 2ψ → ¬ϕi

∨ ¬χ
is refuted in x, contradicting the admissibility of a• in L.
Pick z ∈ C such that z ⊇ b. We have z < x, as 3x ⊆ z. Moreover, z ⊇ 3a implies that
there exists a t > z such that t ⊇ a. We claim that t is a tight predecessor of X. On the one
hand, t ⊇ 3xi, thus t < xi. On the other hand, let u / ∈ X↑. For every i < n, there exists a
ψi such that · 2ψi ∈ xi and ¬ψi ∈ u. Put ψ =
W
i<n ψi: we have ¬ψ ∈ u, but · 2ψ ∈
T
i<n xi,
thus 2ψ ∈ t and t 6< u. 2
Remark 3.9 It is not hard to show that the condition in lemma 3.8 holds for any descrip-
tive frame which validates a•, and conversely, any frame (not necessarily descriptive) which
satisﬁes the condition validates a•. Similar considerations also work for lemmas 3.11 and 3.14.
12Theorem 3.10
(i) Π• is an independent basis of multiple-conclusion rules admissible in GL.
(ii) If L is a consistent logic inheriting GL-admissible single-conclusion rules, then either
{π•
n; n ∈ ω} is an independent basis of L-admissible single-conclusion rules, or L =
GL.3.
Proof: We will skip the proof of (i), which is similar to (ii), but much easier. Assume that
L ⊇ GL and L admits a•. Consider ﬁrst the case when L has width 1, i.e., L ⊇ GL.3. As
every proper extension of GL.3 proves 2n⊥ for some n ∈ ω and GL admits 2n⊥ / ⊥, either
L = GL.3, or L is inconsistent.
Assume that L has width at least 2. Then {π•
n; n ∈ ω} is a basis of L-admissible rules by
theorem 2.1, and lemma 3.4. Fix n ∈ ω, we will show that π•
n is independent on L+{π•
m; m 6=
n}. If n = 0, the irreﬂexive singleton is a model of L + {π•
n; n > 0}, and refutes π•
0. Assume
n ≥ 2 (we will take care of n = 1 later). Let hC,<,V i be the canonical L-frame in ω
variables, and c its generating valuation. By assumption, C contains a two-element antichain
visible from a single point, and a repeated application of lemma 3.8 shows that C has rooted
subframes of arbitrary large width. Let {yi; i < n} be an antichain visible from a point x.
For any i 6= j, yj  yi implies that there exist formulas α
j
i such that yj c · 2α
j
i, and yi 1c α
j
i.
Put αi :=
W
j6=i α
j
i. Then yi c
V
j6=i · 2αj ∧ ¬αi, and as C c GL, there exists xi ≥ yi such
that
(∗) xi c
^
j6=i
· 2αj ∧ 2αi ∧ ¬αi.
The set X = {xi; i < n} is an antichain of n distinct points. Put F0 = X↑, and by induction
on k, let Fk+1 consist of Fk, together with all u ∈ C which are irreﬂexive tight predecessors
of a ﬁnite antichain Y ⊆ Fk distinct from X. Put F =
S
k∈ω Fk, and deﬁne
W = {A ⊆ F; ∃B ∈ V A ∩ F0 = B ∩ F0}.
Claim 1 L is valid in the frame hF,<,Wi.
Proof: It suﬃces to show that every rooted generated subframe of hF,<,Wi validates L. Let
u ∈ F, we will show that the subframes of hF,<,Wi and hC,<,V i generated by u coincide.
It suﬃces to prove that every subset of u↑ r F0 is deﬁnable in u↑. By the construction of
F, u↑ r F0 is ﬁnite. For every i < n and v ∈ u↑ r F0, there exists a formula βi,v such that
xi c · 2βi,v and v c ¬βi,v, because xi  v. We take β =
W
i
V
v βi,v, and observe that ¬β
deﬁnes u↑ r F0 in u↑. As C is reﬁned, we can separate elements of u↑ r F0 from each other,
thus every v ∈ u↑ r F0 is deﬁnable in u↑. 2 (Claim 1)
13Claim 2 The rules π•
m, m 6= n are valid in F.
Proof: Let  be a valuation in F, and u ∈ F which refutes the conclusion of π•
m. We have
u 1 r, and for every i < m, there exist ui > u such that ui  · 2
 
q ∧
V
j6=i pj

∧ ¬pi. By
lemma 3.8, there exist z,t ∈ C such that t is an irreﬂexive tight predecessor of U = {ui; i <
m}, and z < t,u. As U is an antichain of size m 6= n, t ∈ F. We claim that we can choose
z ∈ F as well. We may assume that z is a tight predecessor of {u,t} by another application
of lemma 3.8. Then z ∈ F unless n = 2, and {u,t} = {x0,x1}. In that case we ﬁnd a tight
predecessor t0 of {x0}, and a tight predecessor z of {x1,t0}. By (∗), x0 is irreﬂexive, thus
t0 / ∈ F0, and t0,z ∈ F.
The choice of t and z ensures that t  2q ∧
V
i<m ¬2pi, and z 1 2r, thus the assumption
of π•
m is refuted in z. 2 (Claim 2)
It remains to refute π•
n in hF,<,Wi. We deﬁne a valuation  on F by
u  pi ⇔ u 6= xi,
u  q ⇔ u ∈ F0,
u 1 r.
The points xi are deﬁnable in F0 by (∗), thus  is indeed an admissible valuation in hF,<,Wi.
The assumption of π•
n is valid in F under , because 2q ∧ ¬
W
i<n 2pi can hold only in an
irreﬂexive tight predecessor of X, which does not exist in F. Clearly xi  · 2
 
q∧
V
j6=i pj)∧¬pi.
By the proof of claim 2, there exist z ∈ F such that z < xi for every i < n. Then the conclusion
of π•
n fails in z.
Finally, let us return to the case n = 1. The construction above almost works, the only
place where it could fail is in claim 2 when x0 = u ≤ t: there is no guarantee that x0 has a
predecessor in F. We avoid this problem as follows. We construct an antichain X0 = {x0
0,x0
1}
as in the case n = 2, we ﬁnd a tight predecessor x0 of X0, and proceed with X = {x0} as
before. As x0
0 and x0
1 are deﬁnable in X0↑ and C is reﬁned, x0 is deﬁnable in F0. F contains a
tight predecessor y of {x0
0}, and a tight predecessor z of {y,x0}, as y and x0 are incomparable.
2
Lemma 3.11 Let L be an intermediate logic which admits v, and C a canonical L-frame. If
X = {xi; i < n} is a ﬁnite subset of C and x ≤ X, there exists a reﬂexive tight predecessor t
of X, and z such that z ≤ x,t.
Proof: Put
a =
n
ϕ → ψ; ϕ / ∈
\
i
xi,ψ ∈
\
i
xi
o
,
b =
n_
i
ϕi; ∀i < nϕi / ∈ xi
o
,
c =
n_
i
ϕi → ψ

→
_
i
ϕi

∨ χ; ψ ∈
\
i
xi,χ / ∈ x,∀i < nϕi / ∈ xi
o
.
14The sets x and xi have the disjunction property, and
T
i xi is closed under conjunction, thus
c is closed under disjunction in the following sense: if α,α0 ∈ c, where
α =
_
i
ϕi → ψ

→
_
i
ϕi

∨ χ,
α0 =
_
i
ϕ0
i → ψ0

→
_
i
ϕ0
i

∨ χ0,
then ` α ∨ α0 → β and β ∈ c, where
β =
_
i
(ϕi ∨ ϕ0
i) → ψ ∧ ψ0

→
_
i
(ϕi ∨ ϕ0
i)

∨ (χ ∨ χ0).
If α ∈ c, then α does not hold in C, because
W
i(ψ → ϕi) ∨ χ fails in x, and C validates v0.
By Zorn’s lemma, there exists a maximal set z such that z 0 α for all α ∈ c. The closure
of c under disjunction then guarantees that z has the disjunction property, i.e., z ∈ C and
z ∩ c = ∅.
Clearly z ≤ x. If α ∈ b, then z ∪ a 0 α. Let t ⊇ z ∪ a be maximal with this property. As
b is closed under disjunction, t has the disjunction property, thus t ∈ C. We have z ≤ t ≤ xi
for every i. If t  u, there exists a formula α =
W
i ϕi ∈ b such that u ` α by the maximality
of t. Using the disjunction property of u, we obtain ϕj ∈ u r
T
i xi for some j. As u ⊇ a, we
have u ⊇
T
i xi, and the disjunction property of u implies u ≥ xi for some i. Thus t is a tight
predecessor of X. 2
Theorem 3.12
(i) {Πn; n 6= 1} is an independent basis of multiple-conclusion rules admissible in IPC.
(ii) If L inherits IPC-admissible single-conclusion rules, then either {πn; n ≥ 2} is an
independent basis of L-admissible single-conclusion rules, or L has width at most 2,
and a ﬁnite basis.
Proof: We will only prove (ii). Assume that L admits all IPC-admissible rules. The rules
π0 and π1 are derivable in IPC, thus {πn; n ≥ 2} is a basis of L-admissible rules by theorem
2.1 and lemma 3.4. If L has width at most 2, it derives all πn, n ≥ 3, thus it has a ﬁnite basis
{π2}.
Assume that L has width at least 3, we will show that the basis {πn; n ≥ 2} is independent.
Fix n ≥ 3 (we postpone the case n = 2), let hC,≤,V i be the canonical L-frame, and c its
generating valuation. As in theorem 3.10, lemma 3.11 implies that C has inﬁnite width,
thus let {yi; i < n} be an antichain visible from a point x. There are formulas αi such that
yi c
V
j6=i αj, and yi 1c αi. Let xi ⊇ yi be a maximal set such that xi 0 αi. Then xi is
disjunctive, thus xi ∈ C, and xi ≥ yi.
Let X be the antichain {xi; i < n}, F0 = X↑, and we construct F as the closure of F0
under reﬂexive tight predecessors of ﬁnite antichains distinct from X, as in theorem 3.10. We
deﬁne
W = {A ⊆ F; ∃B ∈ V A ∩ F0 = B ∩ F0}.
15An argument similar to theorem 3.10 shows that hF,≤,Wi is an L-frame, F is downwards
directed, and the rules πm, m 6= n are valid in F. We deﬁne a valuation on F by
u  q ⇔ u ∈ F0,
u  pi ⇔ u  xi,
u 1 r.
The valuation  is admissible in F by our choice of the points xi. We have xi  q∧
V
j6=i pj, and
xi 1 pi. As F is directed, there exists z ∈ F such that z ≤ X, thus z 1
W
i
 
q ∧
V
j6=i pj → pi

.
Let u 1
W
i pi, we will verify u 1
W
i pi → q. The formula
W
i pi is true in F0, and u↑ r F0
is ﬁnite, thus there exists a maximal v ≥ u such that v 1
W
i pi. This means that v is a
predecessor of X, and as it cannot be a tight predecessor, there exists a w  v such that
w / ∈ F0. Then w 
W
i pi and w 1 q.
In the case n = 2, we use the same construction, but we must avoid the situation that X
has no predecessor in F. We ﬁnd an antichain {x0,x0
1,x0
2} as in the case n = 3, and we pick
a tight predecessor x1 of {x0
1,x0
2}. Then we proceed as before. Let t be a tight predecessor of
{x0,x0
1,x0
2}, and u a tight predecessor of {t,x1}. We have t ∈ F, and t 6= x0, thus u ∈ F is a
predecessor of {x0,x1}. 2
Example 3.13 Unlike theorem 3.10, we cannot reduce the width to 1 in theorem 3.12.
• Let L1 be the logic of the Kripke frame F1 = {an,bn; n ∈ ω}, where an+1 < an,
bn+1 < bn, an+1 < bn, and bn+2 < an. L1 has width 2, and inherits single-conclusion
IPC-admissible rules. L1 coincides with the set of formulas provable in IPC under every
substitution using only one variable (cf. [2]).
• Let L2 be the logic of the Kripke frame F2 = {an,bn; n ∈ ω}, where an+1 < an,
bn+1 < bn, an+1 < bn, and bn+1 < an. Again, L2 has width 2, and inherits single-
conclusion IPC-admissible rules. In fact, L2 is the smallest logic (called V in [8]) in
which all IPC-admissible rules are derivable.
It can be shown that L1 is the smallest logic of bounded width inheriting admissible rules of
IPC.
Lemma 3.14 Let L be a transitive logic which admits a◦, and C a canonical L-frame. If
X = {xi; i < n} is a ﬁnite subset of C and x < X, there exists a reﬂexive tight predecessor t
of X, and z such that z < x,t.
Proof: We proceed similarly to lemmas 3.8 and 3.11. For simplicity, we assume that L ⊇ S4.
Put
a =
n^
j
(ϕj → 2ϕj) ∧
^
i<n
¬2ψi; 2ϕj ∈
\
i
xi,ψi / ∈ xi
o
.
As x and a are closed under conjunction, and C validates a◦, the set 3x ∪ 3a is consistent,
hence there exists a z ∈ C such that z ⊇ 3x ∪ 3a. Then z ≤ x, and as a is closed under
conjunction, there exists t ≥ z such that t ⊇ a. We have t ≤ xi. If t  u, but u  xi for
all i, there are formulas ϕi and ψ such that 2ϕi ∈ xi, ¬ϕi ∈ u, ψ ∈ t, and ¬ψ ∈ u. Put
χ =
W
i ϕi ∨ ψ: then 2χ ∈
T
i xi and χ ∈ t, thus 2χ ∈ t, but ¬χ ∈ u, a contradiction. 2
16Theorem 3.15
(i) If L inherits multiple-conclusion admissible rules of S4, then {Π◦
n; n 6= 1} is an inde-
pendent basis of L-admissible multiple-conclusion rules.
(ii) If L inherits S4-admissible single-conclusion rules, then exactly one of the following
cases holds:
• L 0 S4.1, and {π◦
n; n 6= 1} is an independent basis of single-conclusion rules
admissible in L,
• L ` S4.1, and {π◦
n; n ≥ 2} is an independent basis,
• L has width at most 2, and a ﬁnite basis.
Proof: We will concentrate on (ii). If L admits all S4-admissible rules, then π◦ is a basis of
L-admissible rules by theorem 2.1 and lemma 3.4. The rule π◦
1 is derivable in S4. The rule
π◦
0 is dependent on {π◦
n; n > 0} iﬀ L ` S4.1: on the one hand, π◦
0 is derivable in S4.1. On
the other hand, if L 0 S4.1, then the two-element cluster is an L-frame (cf. [2]), validates all
π◦
n, n > 0, and refutes π◦
0.
Assume that L has width at least 3, let hC,≤,V i be the canonical L-frame, and n ≥ 3
(the case n = 2 can be handled by the same trick as in theorems 3.10 and 3.12). As in
the proof of 3.12, there exists an antichain {yi; i < n} in C visible from a point x, and
formulas αi such that yi c
V
j6=i 2αj ∧ ¬αi. Let Ti be a maximal set of formulas such that
{ψ; 2ψ ∈ yi} ⊆ Ti and 2Ti 0 αi, and pick xi ∈ C such that 2Ti ∪ {¬αi} ⊆ xi. Then xi ≥ yi,
xi c
V
j6=i 2αj ∧ ¬αi, and αi holds in every u ≥ xi such that u  xi.
Put X = {xi; i < n}, F0 = X↑, let F be the closure of F0 under reﬂexive tight predecessors
of ﬁnite antichains Z such that Z↑ 6= F0, and let W = {A ⊆ F; ∃B ∈ V A ∩ F0 = B ∩ F0}.
(The condition Z↑ = F0 is equivalent to Z = {zi; i < n} and zi ∼ xi for all i < n. Such a Z
has the same tight predecessors as X.)
As in theorem 3.10 or 3.12, hF,≤,Wi is an L-frame, and validates {π◦
m; m 6= n}. Deﬁne
a valuation on F by
u  q ⇔ u ∈ F0 ∨ ∃v ≥ u(v 6= u ∧ v / ∈ F0),
u  pi ⇔ ¬(xi ≤ u ≤ xi),
u 1 r.
The valuation  is admissible in F, because the cluster of xi is deﬁnable in F0 by ¬2αi. If z
is any predecessor of X in F, then z refutes the conclusion of π◦
n. Assume u 1
W
i 2pi. Then
u / ∈ F0 and u is a predecessor of X. As it is not a tight predecessor, there exists v  u such
that v / ∈ F0, which implies u  q. We may pick v maximal possible, as u↑ r F0 ﬁnite. The
cluster of v is simple, thus v 1 q, and u 1 2q. 2
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